Th is paper presents an account of intuitions, and a defense of their epistemic effi cacy in general, and more specifi cally in philosophy, followed by replies in response to various objections.
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II.
Elsewhere I defend a conception of intuition as a state distinct from and prior to both belief and knowledge.
1 Intuitive belief is based on intuition but goes beyond it, and in turn constitutes intuitive knowledge only if all goes well. In what follows I will presuppose such a conception of intuitions as intellectual seemings of a certain sort, as attractions to assent derived from the sheer understanding of the propositions involved.
Here we focus on propositional intuition, which has the following features:
a. It is a conscious state. b. It has propositional content. c. It is distinct from belief. One can have an intuition that p without believing that p, as when one resolves a paradox by disbelieving one of its elements, despite the powerful intuitive appeal that it retains. d. Its content can be false; there can be false intuitions. e. It does not derive just from perception, introspection, testimony, or inferential reasoning, singly or in combination, not even through the channel of memory. f. It can serve as a basis for belief, helping thus to provide epistemic justifi cation for the supported belief.
An intuition is hence a representationally contentful conscious state that can serve as a justifying basis for belief while distinct from belief, not derived from certain sources, and possibly false. Th us:
S intuits that p if and only if S's attraction to assent to <p> is explained rationally by two things in combination: (a) that S understands it well enough, (b) that <p> is true.
How well does this account of intuition fi t the profi le above? Quite well on the whole, or so I will argue. On this account, intuition is a conscious state of felt attraction rationally explained through the content's being (a) understood well enough by the subject, and (b) true; and such a conscious state can serve as a justifying rational basis for belief, ceteris paribus.
